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The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations: ‘Locking-
In’ the Neoliberal Development Model in Southern Africa? 
 
Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which 
form the central focus of the commitments made in the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 
by the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. EPAs are 
part of a much wider trend witnessed since the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) whereby we have seen the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements. It argues 
that both the material and ideational interests of the EU need to be considered, together with 
the historical context of EU-ACP relations. The EU is portrayed as making a concerted effort 
to ‘lock-in’ neoliberalism across the seven different sub-regions of the ACP group by 
negotiating EPAs that include both reciprocal trade liberalisation and a raft of ‘trade-related’ 
issues. It is suggested that in doing so EPAs will go beyond the requirements for WTO-
compatibility, resulting in a reduction of the policy space for ACP states to pursue alternative 
development strategies. The article then considers the potential developmental impact of 
EPAs with reference to the negotiations with seven of the fifteen member states of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). Here it is argued that the EU is 
promoting ‘open regionalism’ and it is shown how this poses a threat to the coherence of the 
regional project in southern Africa. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2002 the European Union (EU) began negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states.
1
 Since October 2003 
the negotiations have been conducted at the regional level with eventually seven ACP regions 
identified as potential partners.
2
 Faber and Orbie suggest that EPAs, which include bilateral 
free trade agreements (FTAs) with each of the different regions, ‘represent a watershed in 
Europe’s relations with Africa’.3 They should be understood within the context of an 
emerging trend within the politics of international trade that has developed since the creation 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. This is the proliferation of bilateral FTAs 
that has seen over 300 regional trade arrangements having been notified to the WTO since 
1995, which compares with only 123 during the period 1948-1994.
4
 
 
In this article I focus on the negotiation of EPAs with African members of the ACP group 
and in particular the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In contrast to the 
Caribbean region, which at the time of writing is the only region to agree a ‘full EPA’, only 
interim EPAs have been agreed with the other six regions. The WTO waiver granted for the 
non-reciprocal trade preferences offered to ACP states was due to expire at the end of 2007. 
When it became clear that negotiations towards a full EPA would not be achieved in time, to 
avoid a potential challenge within the WTO, it was decided that interim agreements on just 
the trade in goods would be signed with a view to completing more comprehensive deals in 
the future. The EU-SADC interim EPA was signed by four of the seven ‘SADC minus’ states 
involved in the negotiations in June 2009. The other eight members of the SADC were 
involved in three other regions for the purposes of the negotiation of EPAs with the EU. 
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The central argument of this article is that the agreement of a full EPA with SADC will ‘lock-
in’ the neoliberal development model and thus advance its hegemonic position within the 
region. This concerted effort by the EU to assert a neoliberal framework, which includes 
aspects of the regulatory framework beyond simply trade in goods, is criticised for two main 
reasons. First, it is tightening the straightjacket that restricts the policy space available to 
ACP states.
5
 Here I adopt a definition of policy space understood as ‘the flexibility under 
trade rules that provides nation states with adequate room to maneuver to deploy effective 
policies to spur economic development’.6 Second, it is complicating the process of regional 
integration in southern Africa by undermining the coherence of SADC and restricting the 
ability of these economies to diversify. 
 
In taking this stance the article adopts a neo-Gramscian understanding of EPAs that treats 
both the material and the ideational interests of the EU as significant and inter-related.
7
 In this 
regard I problematise the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’. It has become commonplace 
in recent years for scholars to suggest that the EU stands alone from other major actors in 
world politics, because in its external relations it employs an approach based on the diffusion 
of progressive norms alongside military and/or civilian power.
8
 This is also something that 
the EU itself seeks to portray in the construction of its own self-image. For example, the 
Lisbon Treaty states that in its external relations the EU ‘shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free 
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights...’.9 In contrast many 
critiques of EPAs, especially from NGOs, are based on the view that the EU is acting purely 
in its own commercial self-interest. However, I would concur with Storey, who suggests that 
framing the process as being driven by either norms or self-interest is reductionist and both 
need to be considered.
10
 Moreover, the ongoing alignment with neoliberalism reflected in the 
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negotiation of EPAs brings the EU’s material self-interest and the framing of its normative 
goals closer together. 
 
In the following section I outline the evolution of EU development policy and explain how in 
essence the negotiation of EPAs represents a ‘normalisation’ of EU-ACP trade relations. 
Then the ideological and material interests of the EU are discussed in order to highlight how 
both have contributed to the pursuit of EPAs. The second half of the article then assesses the 
rather intricate relationship between the negotiation of EPAs and the WTO before making 
some observations on the impact of the EPA for the development prospects of, and future of 
regional integration in, the SADC region. 
 
Historical background: how did we end up with EPAs? 
 
The EU’s relationship with ACP states has its roots in the colonialism of many of the member 
states. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, included an association with the colonies of the 
original member states, which gave both member states and their colonies preferential trade 
access. This was combined with financial support to the associates through the European 
Development Fund (EDF). The Yaoundé Convention of 1963 that was signed with 18 newly 
independent former colonies maintained the system of preferential trade and financial support 
through the EDF. The sovereignty of these newly independent states was also acknowledged 
and joint political institutions were created. However, as Koutrakou suggests, despite these 
developments, the relationship was still dominated by European economic interests in 
Africa.
11
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In 1975 a new agreement, the Lomé Convention, was agreed with the group of associates that 
had since expanded to include 46 countries. They became known as the ACP group of states. 
Despite its heterogeneity, initially this group demonstrated unity and strength in its 
negotiations with the EU.
12
 This was representative of the nature of North-South relations and 
the ideological climate of ‘Third Worldism’ at the time. Lomé I offered improved trade 
relations for ACP states. These were based on non-reciprocal trade preferences and specific 
commodity protocols for sugar, rum, beef, veal and bananas, whereby the EU committed to 
import a set quota of these goods from ACP states at a guaranteed price.
13
 Enhanced financial 
aid via the EDF was also agreed. Of particular benefit to ACP states was the System for the 
Stabilisation of Export Earnings (STABEX). STABEX was designed to counteract the 
fluctuating revenues that ACP states received from exporting a range of agricultural goods 
that were not covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
14
 
 
However, during the 1980s and 1990s and the successive Lomé Conventions that followed, 
there was an increasing adoption of neoliberal development thinking. For example, in Lomé 
IV, which was signed in 1989, the EU substantially increased the share of funding allocated 
for structural adjustment, with some of this money coming from the newly formed Structural 
Adjustment Support Facility.
15
 The increasing alignment of the Lomé Convention with what 
became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ meant that a continuation of preferential trade 
relations with the ACP states was increasingly questioned within EU policymaking circles. 
Ideas that first came to light in the early 1990s in a paper commonly referred to as ‘Horizon 
2000’, were then formalised in a Green Paper that made the case for an overhaul of the EU’s 
relationship with ACP states.
16
  This argued for multilateral trade liberalisation and suggested 
that the existing non-reciprocal trade preferences were failing to boost ACP exports. It is 
worth noting here that the relative value of these preferences had been steadily eroded during 
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this period, due to successive rounds of trade liberalisation under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
17
 The EU also put particular emphasis on the need 
for its relationship with ACP states to conform to the rules of the WTO. What was not clear 
at this point was the EU’s desire to include a whole raft of trade-related issues.18 
 
This ‘debate’ resulted in the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in June 2000 which proposed 
a new trade arrangement that would avoid the need for a WTO waiver in the future. The 
LDCs within the ACP group would continue to qualify for trade preferences, whilst non-
LDCs would be offered the opportunity to negotiate EPAs with the EU to enable them to 
meet WTO rules on FTAs. This would result in significant problems of implementation given 
that many of the regional groupings, identified for the negotiation of EPAs, consist of a mix 
of LDCs and non-LDCs. The southern African region posed particular problems in this 
regard given the existence of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
between South Africa (and de facto Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS)) 
and the EU. Initially the EU had sought to agree a deal with South Africa alone, which led to 
protests and the request for an impact study from the other SACU members.
19
 This 
experience was one of the key drivers in the decision by the EU to negotiate EPAs at the 
regional level. It is ironic to note that during the TDCA negotiations the EU had prevented 
South Africa from being part of the preferential trade scheme under Lomé, because it was 
suggested that, unlike other ACP states, they would be able to bear the adjustment costs of 
reciprocal trade liberalisation.
20
 
  
In sum, when placed in historical context, we can see that the plan for reciprocal trade 
relations under EPAs is in fact a return to the relationship that was first set-up in the Treaty of 
Rome and then the Yaoundé Conventions. Lomé I can be seen as a high-point in attempts by 
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ACP states to negotiate as equals and achieve some of the changes they, and other developing 
countries, had outlined during the early 1970s in the call for a New International Economic 
Order.
21
 Since the first renegotiation of Lomé in 1979, and in particular during Lomé IV in 
the 1990s, what we have witnessed is the increasing influence of neoliberal ideas on the EU-
ACP relationship. EPAs can therefore be seen as an attempt to achieve what is effectively a 
normalisation of the trade relationship. 
 
Locking-in neoliberalism 
 
The concept of ‘locking-in’ refers to the work of Stephen Gill and his concept of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ whereby regulatory regimes are created to lock-in neoliberal reforms.22 To 
understand the EU’s relationship with ACP states we must acknowledge that it operates 
within a context where the ideas of neoliberalism have become hegemonic.
23
 The system of 
trade preferences that was central to the Lomé Convention is seen by neoliberals as 
antithetical to their belief in the power of the free market to encourage greater 
competitiveness in the global economy.
24
 The Cotonou Agreement is clear in its 
incorporation of this perspective and as Nunn and Price have argued, has a more general 
significance ‘in ensuring the wider compliance of the developing world with multilateral 
liberalisation’.25 
 
During the last decade EU development policy has aligned itself with the Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC).
26
 Like other multilateral actors it now claims poverty reduction is the 
main objective of its approach.
27
 Of course, the international consensus on the benefits of free 
trade for development remains central to the PWC. However, as Faber and Orbie argue, what 
 8 
is new is ‘the growing emphasis on regulatory issues at the national level and on Aid for 
Trade schemes’.28 
 
There is also an ideological commitment, which is particularly strong within the EU, to 
regional integration as part of the neoliberal project. Former European Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, demonstrated this by arguing that ‘based 
on our experience in Europe and that of other regions in the world, we believe that supporting 
regional integration...is an important means to facilitate this inclusion into the process of 
globalisation’.29 The type of regionalism promoted by the EU is often called ‘open 
regionalism’ as the aim is to liberalise within the region without increasing external barriers 
to trade. In addition the EU talks about ‘deep integration’, again based on its own historical 
experience, whereby EPAs will provide the impetus for regions within the ACP to achieve 
not only economic liberalisation but the harmonisation of regulatory standards that help 
business.
30
 
 
When we consider EPAs within the wider context of international development debates I 
would suggest that this reveals a strong ideological alignment with the current consensus. The 
EU’s desire that ‘full-EPAs’ will include significant behind-the-border trade issues can be 
seen as a concerted attempt to secure much ‘deeper’ roots for the neoliberal development 
model. If agreed they will ‘lock-in’ neoliberalism by reducing the policy space for alternative 
development strategies within southern Africa, and other sub-regions of the ACP group of 
states. In doing so, the EU is ensuring that developing countries are prevented from being 
able to pursue some of the policies that were an option during the industrialisation of what are 
now considered developed countries. As Chang argues ‘most of them [developed countries] 
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actively used ‘bad’ trade and industrial policies, such as infant industry protection and export 
subsidies – practices that these days are frowned upon, if not actively banned, by the WTO’.31 
 
The EU’s trade interests 
 
The previous section highlights the ideational aspects to EU-ACP relations that have 
culminated in the negotiation of EPAs. However, the material interests of the dominant 
negotiating power, the EU, must not be discounted from our analysis. In reality these two 
aspects should be seen as complementary. Despite repeated claims by the European 
Commission that EPAs represent little in terms of the direct economic interests of the EU, in 
reality they reflect more than just a desire to lock-in neoliberalism for purely normative 
reasons. 
 
A few years ago the European Commission outlined its vision of the measures the EU needs 
to take in order to become more competitive within the global economy.
32
 Here it is argued 
that there are complementarities between domestic and external policies. With regard to EU 
trade policy it is explicitly stated that the main priority is opening markets abroad and that 
one of the main reasons for this is that it ‘reinforces the competitive position of EU industry 
in a globalised economy’.33 
 
The European Commission has often argued that the ACP as a whole is not a significant 
market or a major destination for European exports. It is certainly the case that the EU is in 
relative terms a much more important trade partner for ACP states than vice versa. In 2010 
the value of EU exports to the ACP group (including South Africa) was € 68.7 billion, which 
represents only 5.1% of total EU exports. In contrast, the European market is of much more 
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importance to ACP states. Table 1 (below) highlights this fact. The EU is a key trade partner 
for both the ACP as a whole and the various trade partners within the SADC EPA 
negotiations. 
 
Table 1: The Significance of Trade with the EU for Selected Regions and Countries 
Region/ 
Country 
Total Value of 
Trade with World 
in 2010 (€ million) 
Total Value of 
Trade with the EU 
in 2010 (€ million) 
EU as a share of 
Total Trade 
(%) 
ACP (including South 
Africa) 
529,704 123,767 23.4 
ACP (excluding South 
Africa) 
411,341 86,361 21.0 
South Africa 
 
118,363 37,405 31.6 
Mozambique 
 
5,651 1,789 31.7 
Angola 
 
45,383 8,292 18.3 
 
Source: All trade data comes from European Commission, DG Trade, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/ [Accessed 27 
July 2011]. 
 
The claim that the EU does not have significant material interests in ACP states has been 
challenged by a number of critics of EPAs (in particular a number of development NGOs).
34
 
Whilst there are direct material interests at stake for the EU these do appear limited. Faber 
and Orbie develop a convincing argument to demonstrate that the main reason for European 
insistence on reciprocal trade liberalisation is not because the ACP group of states represent a 
substantial export market.
35
 
 
However, this is not to say that relations with ACP states are completely unrelated to the 
wider trade interests of the EU. The ‘Global Europe’ strategy outlines that, based on the 
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criteria of large market potential combined with currently existing high barriers to trade, 
priorities for the EU are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea, 
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in Latin America, India, Russia, the Gulf-
Cooperation Council and China.
36
 As discussed below, maintaining preferential trade terms 
for ACP states would require the negotiation of another waiver within the WTO. It is many of 
these emerging (non-ACP) trade partners that, as part of the G20 group of developing 
countries in the WTO, have in the past opposed a waiver for preferential EU-ACP trade 
arrangements. It has been acknowledged that the negotiation of the previous waiver was 
difficult for the European Commission. In fact, concessions such as additional trade access to 
the EU for exports of tuna from a number of Asian countries and banana exports from Latin 
America were needed.
37
 Hence, there is also an indirect link between the negotiation of EPAs 
and the EU’s trade interests. Faber and Orbie conclude that ‘defending the Lomé acquis is 
undoubtedly costly for the EU, whereas its erosion can only benefit Europe’s relations with 
more significant trading partners in Asia and Latin America’.38 
 
Moreover, the United States, in particular, has also been very active in negotiating bilateral 
FTAs and it is clear that the EU is keen to secure a competitive advantage in this regard. 
Adopting a strategy of negotiating with sub-regions of African states signifies the EU’s 
attempt to outdo the US or China who usually negotiate with individual African countries.
39
 
In fact the Commission has argued that ‘where our partners have signed FTAs with other 
countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least’.40 Another key 
player on the African continent in recent years has been China. Chinese trade with Africa has 
grown exponentially during recent years. The SADC region is of particular importance given 
that China’s two main African trade partners for 2008 were Angola and South Africa.41  After 
a decline during 2009 due to the global financial crisis, trade between China and Africa 
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returned to a new record high of US$ 129 billion in 2010.
42
 It is clear that the dominance of 
European interests and influence in Africa, and the SADC region in particular, are being 
challenged by China’s increasing role. This geopolitical context was explicitly acknowledged 
in 2005 in the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’, which acknowledges the growing interest in Africa 
of both familiar players, like the US, and emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil.
43
 
 
EPAs and the WTO 
 
As discussed above, WTO-compatibility was one of the main justifications given by the EU 
for the overhaul of its relationship with the ACP states. The EU has received challenges 
within the WTO to parts of its trade policy over the years. In general, the differentiation in 
EU trade relations has proved problematic. Between 1998 and mid-2005 more than a quarter 
of WTO trade disputes involving the EU, were in some way related to its country 
differentiation.
44
 However, it has never received a direct challenge to the preferential trade 
agreement it had with ACP states via the Lomé Convention.
45
 From 1994, a GATT panel 
ruling meant that these preferences required a waiver in the GATT/WTO due to the fact that 
they were non-reciprocal and discriminatory.
46
 
 
It was therefore argued by the EU that an EPA would be the best option to satisfy WTO rules. 
Article XXIV of the WTO requires EPAs to liberalise ‘substantially all’ trade between the 
EU and the partner regions within ‘a reasonable length of time’. Precedents set in the past 
indicate that the EU will interpret ‘substantially all’ as 90% of currently existing trade.47 The 
lack of flexibility in terms of levels of reciprocity is related to the fact that Article XXIV of 
the GATT was originally created with developed countries in mind.
48
 The alternative offer 
for non-LDCs to the EPAs is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).
49
 The GSP offers 
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inferior access to the EU market and is not negotiated because it is a unilateral offer made by 
the EU. It can therefore be revoked at any time. Thus, EPAs are the only available option to 
ACP states to ensure full contractual trade access to the EU market. 
 
The European Commission has been keen to stress its support for the multilateral system and 
its disappointment at the difficulties encountered during the Doha Development Round of 
negotiations.
50
 The deadlock in these multilateral trade negotiations has increased the 
significance of the EU’s bilateral trade relations with developing countries. The bargaining 
power of developing countries in the WTO is much stronger than in EPA negotiations with 
the EU. With it becoming increasingly likely that full EPAs will be signed before a 
conclusion is reached in the Doha Round, many of the gains made by African states in these 
multilateral negotiations may be undermined by bilateral agreements with the EU.
51
 
 
However, the EU’s commitment to multilateralism is clearly compromised by the desire to 
make EPAs into WTO-plus agreements. They wish to include a number of ‘behind-the-
border’ aspects including the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’. During the Doha Round the EU 
has been an enthusiastic supporter of the inclusion of competition policy, transparency in 
government procurement, national treatment for foreign investors, and trade facilitation 
measures.
52
 However, opposition of developing countries to their inclusion was one of the 
main reasons for the collapse of the trade talks at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancún. As the negotiations over EPAs have progressed, it has become clear that the EU has 
a ‘twin-track’ approach, in that it seeks to pursue its trade policy objectives at the bilateral 
level when obstacles at the multilateral level exist.
53
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The EU-SADC EPA: Good for Development? 
 
Negotiations towards an EU-SADC EPA began in earnest in early 2005. Towards the end of 
the year the SADC member states requested a suspension, to enable them to be able to hold 
their own regional discussions, to address the question of the impact of South Africa’s TDCA 
with the EU. This allowed the SADC region to put together its EPA framework and this was 
presented to the EU in March 2006. This included a proposal to invite South Africa to join 
the negotiations. In November 2006, the European Commission sent a communication to the 
European Council proposing a modification of its EPA negotiating directives, in response to 
the inclusion of South Africa.
54
 South Africa, for its part, claims that it joined the EPA 
negotiations in order to prevent the further break-up of the SADC region as a whole.
55
  
 
The EU portrays EPAs as comprehensive development partnerships that offer much more 
than just a simple FTA. The European Commission is of the opinion that the final EPAs will 
have a beneficial impact on the regulatory framework in ACP countries, which in turn will 
help attract both domestic and foreign investment.
56
 This together with the support for 
regional integration and development finance from the EDF is seen as the ‘added-value’ of 
EPAs. Organisational changes within the European Commission are worth noting here when 
considering where the emphasis lies. Whereas in the past, it was DG Development that would 
negotiate with ACP states, since the Prodi Commission reorganised the Directorates in 1999, 
it has been DG Trade that now has the main responsibility for trade with ACP states, 
including the negotiation of EPAs.
57
 This has led to tension between the two DG’s, 
particularly before it was clear that EDF money would be available to support the negotiation 
of EPAs by contributing to ‘aid for trade’ packages.58 In fact Mold suggests that DG 
Development is much less enthusiastic about EPAs than DG Trade.
59
 Given how central trade 
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relations are to EU-ACP relations as a whole, it is not an overstatement to suggest that DG 
Development has begun to resemble an ‘empty shell’. 
 
A number of ex ante impact studies have been conducted to try to assess the potential impacts 
of trade liberalisation under EPAs. Some of these were funded through the EDF for ACP 
partners and then the results were not made available to the European Commission.
60
 These 
macroeconomic studies often use either general equilibrium or partial equilibrium models and 
tend not to consider the ideational impact of EPAs, or their relationship to the broader 
material interests of the EU. They tend to show that, despite the potential for trade diversion, 
the revenue effects of reciprocal trade liberalisation will be positive. However, at the same 
time some of them express doubts as to the developmental benefits of EPAs. One assessment 
suggests that, unless countries in sub-Saharan Africa unilaterally reduce their MFN tariffs, 
EPAs will be potentially disadvantageous.
61
 Another report, based on research supported by 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa, warns that the benefits of regional integration 
could be compromised by EPAs.
62
 
 
The burden of adjustment will fall most heavily on SADC states during the liberalisation 
phase of trade in goods under the interim EPA. Given that these countries already have 
preferential access to the EU market, and particularly in the case of LDCs, who already 
qualify for duty-free and quota-free access under the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative, 
it is their imports from the EU that will constitute the vast majority of the liberalisation 
schedule. In the case of the ‘SADC-minus’ interim EPA, trade liberalisation has resulted in 
duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market being made available immediately for all 
goods except rice and sugar (where transition periods apply). In return, the SACU member 
states continue to move towards their target of liberalising 86% of their imports from the EU 
 16 
by 2012 (as agreed in the TDCA). Mozambique, as an LDC has until 2023 to liberalise 81% 
of its imports from the EU and all the SADC signatories have decided to liberalise mostly 
industrial and fisheries products.
63
 
 
The power relationship between EPA negotiating parties is extremely asymmetrical. 
Negotiating with one of your major aid donors precludes anything resembling ‘partnership’. 
In December 2007 the ACP Council of Ministers adopted a unanimous declaration in which 
they deplored ‘the enormous pressure that has been brought to bear on the ACP states by the 
European Commission to initial the interim trade arrangements’.64 The EU could be seen to 
have manipulated the agenda by over-loading it with trade-related matters from the outset, 
then using delaying tactics, before presenting a draft final text at the last minute, allowing 
little time for ACP groups to respond adequately.
65
 The effectiveness of ACP states is also 
constrained by a lack of negotiating capacity given they are pursuing trade negotiations at 
three levels – in the WTO, with the EU, and within regional groups.66 Meyn concludes that 
EPA negotiations have increased the division between the EU and ACP and suggests that it is 
only the asymmetry in power and negotiating abilities that enabled interim EPAs to be 
agreed.
67
 
 
This asymmetrical power in the negotiations is aptly demonstrated by the EU’s success in 
keeping the ‘Singapore Issues’ on the agenda for the negotiation of EPAs, given the strong 
opposition of developing countries to them in the WTO. Their inclusion in a full EPA with 
the SADC region will be highly significant for the reduction of policy space. In its March 
2006 negotiating proposal the SADC group argued, amongst other things, that the EPA 
should focus solely on market access and they requested that further negotiations on trade-
related rules should be reduced to non-binding agreements at most. This request was met with 
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a firm rebuttal by the EU who argued that the inclusion of these issues was the ‘essence’ of 
the EPA approach and that they were vital for the achievement of deeper regional integration 
in the SADC region.
68
 If the only full EPA to be signed so far with the Caribbean group 
(CARIFORUM) is a reliable indicator, then rules on investment, competition policy and 
government procurement are likely to become part of the other EPAs.
69
 Hence, the interim 
EPA that has been signed by SADC states commits them to future negotiations on services 
and investment, whilst competition and government procurement will only be discussed once 
sufficient regional capacity exists; intellectual property is not expected to become part of the 
full EPA negotiations.
70
 
 
The European Commission insists that it is precisely these trade-related issues that reflect the 
‘real development component of EPAs’.71 However, some commentators have suggested that 
there are self-interested reasons for their inclusion. Faber and Orbie argue that they provide a 
more conducive environment for potential investors from Europe and set a precedent for 
future trade negotiations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
72
 For Goodison, a focus 
on services provides ‘economic opportunities in those sectors where EU companies are 
strong’.73 Moreover, an agreement on investment would require SADC states not to 
discriminate between foreign and domestic investors. For example, it would prevent host 
countries from making certain demands with respect to levels of local employment. 
Opposition to the inclusion of these ‘new generation’ issues has been expressed both by civil 
society organisations and trade ministers at the African Union.
74
 In general, their inclusion 
would make it very difficult for governments in southern Africa to adopt an industrial policy 
that sought to protect and develop its own local firms. Similarly liberalisation of government 
procurement would also prevent any preferences for domestic providers over European ones. 
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The liberalisation of trade resulting from the EU-SADC EPA will also have a detrimental 
effect on tariff revenues collected by SADC states. This is of particular concern for countries 
that are heavily reliant on the contribution customs duties make to government revenue. 
Under the SACU, customs duties go into a common revenue pool and are distributed in 
favour of the BLNS states, which are dependent on this revenue as it contributes to a 
significant fraction of their overall government revenue. One impact study prepared for the 
European Commission provides some estimates of the losses in tariff revenue resulting from 
the implementation of EPAs. It concluded that although the SADC region could expect the 
lowest losses of all the ACP regions, they would still suffer between a 37% and 58% cut in 
tariff revenues on imports from the EU by 2022, based on two alternative scenarios for the 
potential list of goods that are excluded from liberalisation.
75
 
 
The EU-SADC EPA also raises a number of issues in relation to the impact that it will have 
on African regionalism. It is a particularly problematic case given the fact that South Africa 
has already agreed a TDCA with the EU. Moreover, due to the existence of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), which has a common external tariff, this also has an impact 
on the other four SACU member states. The current state of play in the EU-SADC EPA 
negotiations is shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: The State of Play in the EU-SADC EPA Negotiations (July 2011) 
‘SADC minus’ 
Country 
LDC? Southern African Customs 
Union member state? 
EPA status? 
South Africa No Yes Non-signatory but part of 
EU-SACU TDCA 
Botswana No Yes Signed Interim EPA on 
4 June 2009 
Lesotho Yes Yes Signed Interim EPA on 
4 June 2009 
Namibia No Yes Initialled Interim EPA on 
11 December 2007 but not 
ready to sign 
Swaziland No Yes Signed Interim EPA on 
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4 June 2009 
Mozambique Yes No Signed Interim EPA on 
15 June 2009 
Angola Yes No Non-signatory but as an 
LDC qualifies for EBA 
initiative 
 
The current situation is deeply challenging for the coherence of regional integration within 
the SADC region. During the EPA negotiations the coherence of SADC as an organisation 
has been compromised. Most of the member states are involved in other regional EPA 
negotiations and the focus is now on SACU rather than SADC. In addition, the interim EPA 
has only been signed by three of the five members of the SACU. The SACU has a common 
external tariff and as a result individual member states are prevented, under the terms of the 
2002 SACU Agreement, from unilaterally negotiating a trade deal with a third party. With 
South Africa (and de facto Namibia) currently continuing to trade with the EU under the 
terms of the TDCA, both tariffs and rules of origin are not consistent. This will require new 
customs controls within SACU. These developments have led to serious political questions 
being raised over the future of this historic customs union.
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 South Africa is particularly 
unhappy with the inclusion in the EPA of the ‘Most-Favoured Nation’ clause. Article 28 of 
the interim EPA states that ‘the SADC EPA States shall accord to the EC Party any more 
favourable treatment applicable as a result of the SADC EPA States or Signatory SADC EPA 
State becoming party to a free trade agreement with any major trading economy after the 
signature of this Agreement’.77 No such clause applies to the TDCA that South Africa 
negotiated with the EU. 
 
The pressure from the EU to negotiate EPAs on a regional basis is causing undue stress on 
what remain highly-underdeveloped regional groupings across Africa. It would have been 
more helpful if these African regional organisations had been able to create more robust 
 20 
arrangements amongst themselves before having to negotiate with the most integrated 
regional bloc in the world. The EU argues that for ACP states to develop they need to 
increase regional trade between themselves and that in doing so this will help with the 
diversification of their export base. However, opening up to EU competition would threaten 
local manufacturing and food processing industries and therefore it is even less likely that 
ACP states will be able to diversify and develop nascent industrial sectors.
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 Even a mid-term 
report by the European Commission on Sustainability Impact Assessments acknowledged 
that processing and manufacturing capacity may be discouraged.
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 Hence, if the interim EPA 
with SADC becomes a ‘full EPA’ this will have significant implications for the alternative 
development strategies available to countries in the region. Moreover, as an UNCTAD report 
made clear this often leaves the use of tariffs as the only option for developing countries, but 
bilateral FTAs such as the EPAs proposed by the EU, further restrict their use.
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 As discussed 
above, the EU’s desire to include a whole raft of trade-related issues, will make it very 
difficult for governments in southern Africa, to pursue an approach resembling the 
‘developmental state’ strategy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In September 2002, at the outset of the EPA negotiations, the General Secretariat of the ACP 
group of states stressed ‘the importance of maintaining and strengthening ACP unity and 
solidarity throughout the negotiations’.81 However, it has become clear during the protracted 
regional negotiations that this view was more than a little naïve. As discussed above, the 
EPAs have not only negatively impacted upon the significance of the ACP group as a whole, 
but have also complicated attempts to develop regional organisations, particularly in the case 
of southern Africa. Moreover, the shift in responsibility for negotiating with ACP states from 
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DG Development to DG Trade further reveals the marginalisation of the ACP group. These 
developments led Bretherton and Vogler to conclude that ‘the new focus upon differentiation 
and regionalization may well mark the beginning of the end of this highly institutionalized 
relationship’.82 
 
One recent development that is worthy of consideration is the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty by the final outstanding EU member state. What impact, if any, will this have on 
relations with ACP states and in particular the negotiation of EPAs? The Lisbon Treaty 
makes it clear that the EU’s relations with ACP states should be coherent with respect to the 
broader framework of its external relations.
83
 This desire for increased policy coherence is a 
key task for the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The failure 
to make a direct reference to the ACP group in the Lisbon Treaty, as had been done in 
previous EU treaties, has increased the fears, noted above, about the break-up of this historic 
grouping of states. This has led Sicurelli to conclude that ‘African negotiators in the EPAs 
noticed that the European positions were actually dividing, rather than uniting African 
states’.84 In a similar vein, van Reisen suggests that, since the late 1990s, EU development 
policy has increasingly become threatened with subordination to the EU’s other external 
priorities, which are reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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 This article’s 
analysis of EPAs confirms this impression, given the ‘normalisation’ of EU-ACP trade 
relations that they represent. 
 
In sum, the main argument of this article is that the negotiation of EPAs by the EU is a 
concerted attempt to lock-in neoliberalism within ACP states. This is understood as reflecting 
both the material and the ideational interests of the EU and is to be achieved through the 
inclusion of both trade liberalisation and a raft of trade-related issues, which aim to secure an 
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improved regulatory framework for European capital. The EU’s failure to promote these 
norms in the Doha Round of the WTO has led to a more coercive approach whereby their 
diffusion is achieved through bilateral agreements. These behind-the-border issues limit the 
policy options for ACP states. The added focus on promoting regional integration is intended 
to further cement neoliberal development ideology via the promotion of ‘open regionalism’ 
across the different regions within the ACP group. 
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